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How Not to Be an Atheist
The  God  Delusion, Richard  Dawkins  (Bantam  Press  2006),  Pp.  416,  ISBN: 
0593055489, Pbk. €10.
Anyone who attempts to write on one of the three ‘great questions’, namely, 
God, the Universe and Humankind, should remind themselves of the limits of 
such an endeavour by pasting many small pieces of paper around the house 
with the words ‘I don’t know’ written on them, especially if one is going to have 
the bravery or audacity to write on all  three. Philosophers are perhaps a bit 
better than scientists in using (or having to use) these few small words since we 
are aware of the ghost of Socrates at our elbows. So it is that while the author of 
The  God  Delusion may  spend  much  of  his  time  reminding  others  of  their 
ignorance, he unfortunately forgets his own in particular and that of science in 
general.
This  is  a  book which I  think the author will  regret  writing.  Previous 
books which abounded in enthusiasm, beautiful prose, and sheer wonder at the 
marvels revealed by science rarely appear here. There is a regrettable tendency in 
the book towards rhetoric and point-scoring rather than argument. Again, he 
blunders into many areas where angels would fear to tread. This is because he 
regards science as the only  magisterium and so he feels competent to judge of 
many  matters  where  friends  might  have  advised  caution.  Although  the 
presentation is  engaging,  the  structure  of  the  book is  extremely  weak since 
Dawkins seemed to have exchanged scholarship for journalism.
At the beginning of the book, Dawkins states that the work is written for 
those who have been raised as religious and did not know that they could leave. 
His book deals with four main areas, all in a rather polemical, ‘consciousness-
raising’ style, intended to encourage the aspiring atheist, who may perhaps be 
faltering along the way: 
• To be an atheist is a brave and splendid aspiration
• The power of ‘cranes’ such as natural selection
• Religion and childhood
• Atheist pride
So far so good. If someone has examined the arguments and come to 
the conclusion that there is no God, then this is to be respected. However, if 
one first asks for respect for one’s atheistic views, it hardly serves to bolster 
ones  case  by  then entering  into a  polemic  with opponents  who are  termed 
‘faith-heads’ (pp. 5-6). Religious fundamentalists are very much the bogeymen 
of  the  book.  Yet  fundamentalism is  not  just  confined  to  religion.  Dawkins 
surely cannot equate all religious belief with bigotry just because some believers 
are prejudiced—this unfortunately is a fallacy repeated throughout the length of 
the book.
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Lack of clarity or the blurring of distinctions makes it quite difficult for 
the reader to follow him at times and to be quite sure what he means. Already 
early on in the book, Dawkins seems to wish to regard pantheism as being the 
same  as  atheism  or  at  least  as  being  so  close  to  atheism  as  to  make  no 
difference. Now a philosophical theist is not the same as a religious theist, an 
agnostic is not the same as a pantheist, and certainly a pantheist is not an atheist. 
A religious person will recognise something of the quality of Einstein’s wonder 
at the universe as something he or she also experiences. The strange thing is 
that while Dawkins admits that he shares this experience himself he wishes to 
deny that someone such as Einstein might have really meant that this was a 
‘pantheistic’ experience. In fact, we are told that ‘Pantheism is sexed-up atheism’ 
(p. 18). Furthermore, Dawkins regards the metaphorical use of the word ‘God’ 
by physicists as something which should be refrained from and that to confuse 
the pantheistic God of the physicists with the God of ordinary language is ‘an 
act of intellectual high treason’ (p. 19).
Already by p. 21 Dawkins strays into an area with which we are perhaps 
more familiar than he is; Northern Ireland. His contention is rather strange, that 
there the conflict between Catholics and Protestants has been euphemised into 
a conflict between Nationalist and Loyalists respectively. Clearly nobody told 
him  about  the  difference  between  Nationalist  and  Republican,  between 
Unionist and Loyalist; here as in many places throughout the book, he is simply 
careless. It is the attention to detail which marks out the success of modern 
science  and he  really  should know better  if  his  job  is  to  promote  a  public 
understanding of science. It simply annoys that he did not bother to check to 
see if there are Protestant Republicans or Catholic Unionists. The book is full of 
examples which he picks at random and which show that his views at times tend 
to be unscientific and over-simplistic and what is perhaps sad to point out in a 
scientist,  an impatience with subtle or fine distinctions made by others.  The 
intellectual  credentials  of  theologians  are  dismissed  without  there  being  any 
acknowledgment that (within the Catholic tradition at least but by no means 
confined to it) a trained theologian must be educated in philosophy as well as 
psychology, sociology, law, history, science, and so on.
Pages  24-27  contain  examples  which  are  drawn from past  abuses  in 
order  to  reach  general  conclusions.  As  I  have  mentioned  already,  Dawkins 
should know that this kind of procedure is invalid. And yet he is right to say 
that the respect which can be accorded to another person’s religious sensitivities 
has a limit. This is part of the frustration in reading this book. There is much 
that a scientifically and philosophically educated person will agree with Dawkins 
about, but the erratic nature of his arguments, the lack of fair-mindedness in the 
people he targets, make him a floating mine, a threat to friend and foe alike. The 
publisher of the book also bears a certain amount of blame since they should 
have  made  the  author  aware  of  the  fact  that  he  needed  a  friendly  but 
philosophically educated reader to prune his excesses and to weed out those 
arguments which are not particularly fit to survive. 
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Dawkins  (like  many  liberal  theologians  actually)  does  not  seem  to 
entertain the notion that a religious belief could be true because based upon 
something which really happened. (I remember once in the course of a lecture 
presenting some of views of the Anglican theologian Don Cupitt as published 
in an interview given to the  Philosophers’  Magazine.  One student confessed to 
being delighted to hear such views since, as an atheist, it seemed to him that 
theologians such as Cupitt were finally coming around to his point of view!) 
Most believers not only believe in something because it seems good to do so 
(belief in) but also because it contains a factual basis (belief that). The belief 
which springs from a reading of the New Testament accepts its supernatural 
character, otherwise the teaching contained therein would not differ from any 
philosophical or moral teaching. Dawkins like many others may dispute that the 
miraculous events of the New Testament really took place. Like Hume he may 
be sceptical about all reports of purported miracles, but he cannot reject them 
out of hand unless he can demonstrate their impossibility. Hume, arguably a 
greater mind that Dawkins, fell into the same trap of confusing implausibility 
with impossibility  and  attacking  miracles  with  fallacious  arguments,  most  of 
which were ad hominem. A believer will hold that what he believes is true because 
it  is  based  on  the  report  of  something  which  really  happened,  and  that 
otherwise it is really not worth believing in. One may not share these beliefs, 
one  may  reject  what  one  perceives  to  be  credulity  in  another  but  the 
improbability does not rule out a prima facie case for examining the truthfulness 
or otherwise of such beliefs. Any fair-minded person (including someone with a 
robust faith I presume) can laugh with him at some of the excesses of religious 
credulity as long as we can also laugh at the credulity of scientists as well—who 
now recalls  the  welcome given by some scientists  to  the discovery  of  ‘cold 
fusion’ and to the ‘memory’ of water?
A central plank in Dawkins’ position is that religion is a delusion, and 
not only that it deludes but that its effects are pernicious. As a corollary, he 
regards atheism as virtuous because among other things it involves the virtue of 
honesty. One of the points made against this view is that enlightened scepticism 
or atheism seems fine for an elite who can take comfort in a pleasant society 
which is underpinned either by religious belief or secular forms of Christianity 
such as socialism. Critics have pointed to examples of totalitarian regimes which 
were aggressively atheist and which were responsible for millions of deaths. The 
response that religion has also been responsible for innumerable deaths is hardly 
a good answer. Philosophers for centuries have pointed out that the acquisition 
of virtue and the avoidance of vice does not necessarily go hand in hand with an 
individual’s religious belief or lack of one. It is obvious that some atheists are 
good and some are bad, just like some Christians are good and some are bad. 
Again, if an atheist expects toleration, surely she or he should extend toleration 
to the public expression of religious belief and individual conscience (p. 45).
Although  most  people  will  make  a  distinction  between  atheism  and 
agnosticism,  Dawkins  wishes  to  show  that  the  low  probability  of  God’s 
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existence leads to de facto atheism (p. 47). Indeed, this is his own acknowledged 
position and, to many, it will seem that his position is close to that of Hume. 
There is a theoretical difference of course between the two, as has already been 
alluded to above, but here Dawkins will argue that from a practical point of 
view  agnosticism  in  everyday  life  is  indistinguishable  from  atheism.  He 
comments (p. 53) that our position regarding an open question will normally be 
somewhat 50/50 and that the evidence tends to move us more to one side 
rather than to the other. However, lack of evidence will also from a practical 
point of view make us tend towards one point of view rather than the other. 
Dawkins contends that if no evidence can be found, one should adopt a mental 
stance which is close to atheism. However, surely the difference between an 
atheist and an agnostic is that the atheist like the theist has made up his or her 
mind in a more or less definitive fashion. On p. 55 Dawkins seems to have a 
problem with the sincerity of many religious believers or theistic philosophers. 
Scientists who likewise stray and affirm even a minimal theism also have their 
sincerity questioned. Surely if a person writes something, we are not entitled to 
say without evidence that they did not mean it. And yet this is how Dawkins 
regards Stephen Jay Gould in his book Rocks of Ages. Gould’s crime, as it were, 
is to put forward the notion of non-overlapping magisteria or NOMA, i.e., that 
the competence of the scientist might be restricted to a specific field of inquiry 
and that others might be experts in their own field. What Dawkins will  not 
concede is that a theologian (or any theist) has any authority to speak because 
there is only one magisterium, that of science and of its servants. Religion can 
have no authority because Dawkins does not accept the existence of miracles or 
supernatural events. Even less so does he accept the notion that a religion might 
be divinely revealed. Although he does not say so explicitly, he seems to imply 
that the competing truth claims of the various religions cancel each other out. 
Nor does he mention that in the case of reported miracles that the Catholic 
Church, for example, does take the care to ask scientific and medical experts to 
carry out investigations to see if the event might have a natural explanation. 
One will, however, have sympathy with his rejection of the ‘prayer experiment’ 
(p. 67) and our natural  sense of justice will  also lead many readers to reject 
Swinburne’s ‘grotesque’ argument that ‘some people need to be ill’.
A version of Flew’s challenge appears on pp. 69-71. One might not be 
able to disprove the existence of alien life, Dawkins argues, but at least we can 
write  down the kind of  evidence which might count for  or  against  it.  Why 
should the case of God be any different? It is clear that for Dawkins the God 
hypothesis  is  not  outside  of  the  remit  of  science  since  there  is  no  other 
discipline competent to deal with matters of fact. 
This leads into chapter 3 which examines some philosophical arguments 
for the existence of God. This is perhaps the part which the trained philosopher 
will most look forward to since it is what she or he will be most familiar with. 
But what a disappointment! With what a heavy heart and internal groaning do 
we  anticipate  Dawkins’s  mistakes  being  repeated  over  and  over  again  in 
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undergraduate examination scripts for years to come! It  is a matter of some 
wonder that the author cannot even get Aquinas’s Five Ways right. Dawkins 
could have at least copied them down accurately, something we would expect 
from a First Year philosophy student. It reflects badly upon him as a scholar 
and questions the reliability of what he writes elsewhere in the book that he gets 
such a  simple  task  so  badly  wrong.  Students  are  always  warned against  the 
dishonesty inherent in constructing a ‘straw man’ which is exactly what Dawkins 
does here. It seems that he is so convinced that Aquinas is wrong that he does 
not have to understand what Aquinas wrote. 
In particular, Dawkins gets the Third Way hopelessly wrong (p. 77). He 
then goes on to make the assertion that the first three ways use the notion of 
regress and invoke God to terminate it. For some strange reason he seems to 
think (following Hume, it appears) that having invoked an absolute ‘Terminator’ 
that it is then an unwarranted assumption to hold that God is immune to the 
regress. How strange that it never occurred to Aquinas to ask what came before 
God!  Now one can say  that  there  is  no First  and that  a  potentially  infinite 
regress is all that there is, but it is hardly fair that if someone holds that God is 
First absolutely to then ask them what came before? As a question it makes little 
sense and even less sense as an objection. However, no-one is going to argue 
that such arguments as put forward in the first three of the Ways say very little 
about the nature of God. Indeed, a First Cause argument only seeks to establish 
the  existence  of  a  ‘Terminator’  and  not  the  God  of  theism.  Furthermore, 
Dawkins’s contention that omnipotence and omniscience have been shown to 
be mutually incompatible (p. 78) would be news indeed to Boethius.
Dawkins rushes on getting the fourth way wrong, confusing moral and 
ontological goodness. Again, an undergraduate would explain to him why the 
argument cannot be used to establish the existence of privations.
The Fifth Way surely is the one that we would expect Dawkins to get 
right (p. 79) at least out of his own professional curiosity. However, like many 
others  he seems to  think  that  Aquinas’s  argument  is  the  same as  Paley’s—
teleology is not quite the same as design. In general, Aquinas’s reflections on 
directedness in nature take place in the context of the intelligibility of nature as a 
whole. Dawkins, I suppose, is not to be expected to know that Aquinas knew of 
some  elements  of  an  evolutionary  theory,  namely  birds  and  fish  having  a 
common ancestor, and the role of random mutations. Darwin gave a natural 
explanation  for  how  life  develops  from  a  common  source  without  the 
intervention  of  an  Intelligence  during  the  course  of  the  process  once  the 
process had begun. There are some things yet to be explained such as why the 
universe should be intelligible and (stranger and more marvellous still) how the 
dust of stars can become conscious and intelligent.
Dawkins, curiously enough, is far better on the ontological argument (p. 
80) and the references to Russell are very interesting indeed. Other arguments 
for the existence of God get short shrift and in some cases rightly so since they 
either would not be regarded as valid or as philosophically significant. Indeed, 
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some of the arguments, such as the argument from Emotional Blackmail (p 85) 
are downright ridiculous. The reader, however, is not informed or made aware 
that philosophers would not heap such arguments together as if they were all 
the same, nor that the trite presentation of some of them is a distortion.
The  next  chapter,  entitled  ‘Why  there  almost  certainly  is  no  God’ 
contains  a  variation  upon  the  principle  of  Falsification.  Dawkins  helpfully 
provides  what  he would accept as  falsifying evolution,  namely  fossils  in  the 
wrong strata (p.  125).  He gives  a good (if  not  conclusive)  argument against 
irreducible complexity,  pace Behe. On the other hand, the quotation attributed 
to Augustine seems to be taken out of context: Augustine is warning against 
wasting time on speculation which will lead to nowhere and not against science 
per  se.  Dawkins  would  surely  admit  that  some  funded  research  projects  in 
science may well turn out to be a waste of time and money. Again, one cannot 
but agree with Dawkin’s statement (p. 134) that we get nowhere by labelling our 
ignorance God and few contemporary theists would resort to such a ‘God of 
the  Gaps’.  Again,  some  religious  writers  seem  to  base  their  rejection  of 
evolution  by  singling  out  gaps  in  the  theory  but  this  is  dangerous  to  their 
position because it is quite likely that such gaps will be closed in the future. It is 
a matter of concern that we hear rumours that guides in National Parks in the 
US cannot  refer  to  the ‘purported’  age  of  the  fossils.  The peril  of  opening 
religious belief to ridicule by the use of such an ‘omphalos’ theory was already 
amply demonstrated in Father and Son by Edmund Gosse. 
I am afraid that I find it hard to follow Dawkins contention (p. 137) that 
the origin of life,  being a  highly improbable event on the natural  scale,  and 
therefore unlikely to be intended,  implies  that  the  origin of  life  is  therefore 
absolutely unintended. As he points out, the origin of life is the real problem 
since the diversification of life has already been largely explained. He rules out, 
of  course,  that  the  origin  of  life  can  have  anything  other  than  a  natural 
explanation. A similar line of argument is given (p. 143) where the improbability 
of a Goldilocks Universe (one ‘just right’ for life) is held by Dawkins to lead to 
the improbability of God. This may be the case if one treats God as an object 
within the universe. For Dawkins, the hypothesis concerning the existence of 
God must always be an empirical one and there is no way in which he is willing 
to treat of God as a being which transcends the universe. If God cannot be the 
object of science, then for Dawkins he has the same status as ‘fairies at the 
bottom of the garden’.1 Again, it seems to me that Dawkins rightly dismisses the 
argument that the universe ‘knew’ we were coming – given the way that our 
corner of the universe is set up, only the kind of life which we find here could 
have emerged.
1 See the dedication of the book to Douglas Adams. Adams was the author of  The 
Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy, which I thoroughly enjoyed as a teenager when it was 
made into a television series.  In this spirit perhaps it might be pointed out (verbum 
cognoscenti) that whereas science might come up with the answer ‘42’, only philosophy 
might discover the question! 
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Although Dawkins acknowledges that there is nothing in physics to rival 
the explanatory model of Darwinian evolution in biology, he is curiously silent 
on the limits of scientific knowledge as evidenced, for example, in the on-going 
realism/anti-realism debate regarding the theoretical particles which constitute 
atomic theory. Dawkins never seems to doubt that evolution provides and will 
provide an explanation for the facts of biological life.
The  uneven  nature  of  the  book  manifests  itself  in  the  pages  which 
follow. Can the world’s more than one billion Catholics really be expected to 
take him seriously when he states that a Catholic of normal frailty and less than 
normal intelligence suffers a ‘semi-permanent state of morbid guilt?’ (p. 167). 
Again, he is hardly original or convincing in putting forward the thesis that a 
belief  in an immortal  soul  and the existence of  God is  part  of  a childhood 
attitude. Dawkins never seems willing to accept that there is the possibility of a 
mature religious faith or an intelligent philosophical theist—all are deluded. He 
appears to be on thin ice when he tries to use a scientific theory of natural 
selection to explain language and religion (p.  188) and fellow scientists have 
difficulty in treating the theory of memes seriously. Here, as elsewhere, Dawkins 
resists the extension of the notion of the survival of the fittest to a form of 
social Darwinism but seems unable to say why (p. 221). Pity and generosity to a 
stranger are described as ‘blessed precious mistakes’—we should not act in an 
altruistic fashion but inexplicably we do.
In  a  section  entitled  ‘The  Roots  of  Morality’  (pp.  222-33),  Dawkins 
spends some time arguing that religion is not necessary for morality with some 
mention of Kant. There is little which is novel here and most people will have 
little difficulty in accepting that the fear of punishment will not make people 
moral. He is probably right when he states that atheists are likely to subscribe to 
humanism,  to  have  had  access  to  higher  education,  to  be  intelligent  and 
reflective and so less likely to be criminals. However, there is little reason to 
think (and to be fair Dawkins would probably concede the point) that if atheism 
were to become a mass movement that it would not also include people who 
are stupid and immoral.
The remaining chapters of the book (7 to 10) are less interesting from a 
philosophical point of view. I will, therefore, limit myself to a few observations. 
Dawkins is right when he points out the immorality of some of the passages of 
the Old Testament which are clearly unacceptable. He is also right in pointing 
out  that  religion can make good people  do bad things  but  so can  football, 
politics, etc. There are more fundamental questions here which Dawkins does 
not address nor does he feel the need to do so. The new Ten Commandments 
which  he  reprints  (pp.  263-4;  he  got  them  on  the  internet)  are  fairly 
unobjectionable but his own additions seem rather banal. He implies, however, 
that  it  is  fairly  easy  to  achieve a  natural  moral  consensus that  any  ordinary 
decent person would come up with but then he retracts this (p. 286) because 
some people subscribe to moral absolutism and extremism. Examples follow 
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regarding extremists on such issues as homosexuality and abortion. However, 
an  extremist  is  hardly  representative  and  most  people  will  oppose 
fundamentalism (both  religious  and scientific)  since  it  is  opposed  to  reason. 
Although he has a certain sympathy (because of his dislike of ‘unfairness’) for 
Catholic clergy in Ireland and America who have been demonised over the issue 
of child sexual abuse, he regards the psychological harm of being brought up as 
a Catholic in the first place as worse (p. 317). Nor does Continental Philosophy 
fare much better. Dawkins (p. 347) dismisses Foucault, Barthes and Kristeva as 
‘icons of haute francophonyism’.
Something  of  vintage  Dawkins  will  be  found  in  the  section  entitled 
‘Inspirations’. Here he brings to life the marvel that is modern science and the 
wonder it can inspire. Dawkins points out that science reveals to us a universe 
which is infinitely richer than our senses can ever disclose to us. He shows how 
bright and imaginative and insightful the great scientific mind has to be. Here 
we begin to understand why he needs to fight against some religious people 
who would wish to deprive us for ever of seeing such marvels.
And this is really the nub of the problem, the ‘original sin’ as it were of 
The  God Delusion.  Dawkins has  the  means to carry believers  and unbelievers 
forward in an appreciation and love of science. He can show us why we must 
fight  against  those  who would  make  us  sit  in  the  dark,  watching  shadows. 
However, his rhetoric and invective, his poor logic and fallacies, weaken his case 
and the cause of science. A discipline such as science teaches the use of precise 
and  painstaking  measurement  but  here  Dawkins  reaches  for  a  blunderbuss, 
shooting out arguments both good and bad, some hit the mark and some do 
not, but he hits friend and foe alike. The book purports to deal with a delusion 
but what it delivers is disillusionment. As H. Allen Orr writes: ‘Though I once 
labelled Dawkins a professional atheist, I’m forced, after reading his new book, 
to conclude he’s actually more an amateur.’2
National University of Ireland, Maynooth Michael Dunne
2 The New York Review of Books 54-1, January 11, 2007.
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